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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

ANGELA BYERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 20000782-SC

CREATIVE CORNER, INC.
and LYN PELTON,
Priority 15
Defendants and Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

Defendants/Appellees Creative Corner, Inc. and Lyn Pelton (hereinafter
"Defendants"or "Appellees" ), by and through counsel E. Paul Wood, submits the
following Brief of Appellees in the above-referenced appeal:
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITIES
This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
78-2-2(3)0) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court correctly grant Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for

Failure to State a Claim where Plaintiff sues her former employer (which employs less
than fifteen (15) persons) and an officer of her former employer under a common law
1

theory of wrongful discharge based upon sexual discrimination where the Complaint
alleges that a public policy exception to the at-will employment presumption is stated in
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. §§34A-5-101, et seq. ("UADA")
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3 ("Title VII"). The
standard of review of a trial court's granting a motion to dismiss is correctness.
Peterson v. Board ofEduc, 1993 UT 855 P.2d 241, 242. The trial court is required to
take all allegations stated in the Complaint as true and consider all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Prows
v. State, 1991 UT 822 P.2d 764. The court shall dismiss a claim only in the event the
Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim. Colman v. Utah State Land
Bd., 1990 UT 795 P.2d 622.
2.

Did the trial court properly exclude from its consideration of Appellant's

Motion for a New Trial new legal theories raised for the first time in Appellant's Rule
59(a)(7) Motion for a New Trial? The trial court's ruling on a Rule 59 Motion for a
New Trial is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Child v. Gonda, UT
1998 972 P.2d 425, 428.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, §§34A-5-101 etseq. is included in the Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
2

Appellant Angela Byers (hereinafter "Byers" or "Appellant") sues her former
employer, Creative Comer, Inc., and its officer, Lyn Pelton, claiming wrongful discharge
in violation of Utah public policy because at the time of her termination, Angela Byers
was pregnant. Since Creative Comer, Inc. employed less than fifteen (15) employees at
the time of termination, Byers could not state a claim for relief against Creative Comer,
Inc. under the UADA or Title VII, and hence initiated a common law tort action for
wrongful discharge based on sexual discrimination alleging a public policy exception
found in Title VII to the at-will employment presumption.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On November 5, 1999, Byers filed a Complaint alleging the common law claim of
wrongful termination. Appellees' filed their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and for
Attorneys Fees and Memorandum in support thereof. Byers filed her Memorandum
Opposing the Motion to Dismiss and Appellees filed their Reply Memorandum. Appellees
filed the Notice to Submit for Decision with request for oral argument, which was
scheduled for February 14, 2000. Prior to oral argument, this court decided Burton v.
Exam Center Industrial and General Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, 994 P.2d 1261.
Byers, whose attorney represented Dr. Burton in the Burton case, filed a Supplemental
Authorities memorandum on the strength of the Burton case, stating, "Burton addresses
virtually all of the issues addressed in this matter" (Supplemental Authorities P.l; R. 100;
see Addendum) and also alleging additional statutory authority. Appellees filed their Reply
3

Memorandum. The court granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss after oral argument. Byers
filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging error at law, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(7) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, with supporting Memorandum. Appellees filed their Reply
Memorandum and Byers filed her Notice to Submit for Decision. The trial court denied
Byers' Motion for a New Trial under its Memorandum Decision. The Complaint, Motion
to Dismiss and Memorandum, Appellant's Supplemental Authorities Memorandum and
Rule 59 Motion and Memorandum and the Court's Order and Memorandum Decision are
included in the Addendum, for this court's review. Byers appealed the trial court's
granting of Appellees' Motion to Dismiss and denial of her Motion for a New Trial.
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT
Byers' Complaint was dismissed by the trial court based upon Appellees' Motion
to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.
RELEVANT FACTS
The facts set forth in the single cause of action alleged in the Complaint are:
1.
Defendant Creative Corner, Inc., is a Utah
Corporation in good standing doing business in Salt Lake
County. (Record at 1.)
2.
Defendant Lyn Pelton is an officer of Defendant
Creative Corner, Inc., and the person who made all relevant
decisions and took all relevant actions alleged herein. (Record
atl.)

4

3.
All actions alleged herein took place in Salt
Lake County and venue and jurisdiction are appropriate in
Salt Lake County. (Record at 1-2.)
4.
The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendant
Creative Corner, Inc. at a rate of $ 11.00 per hour plus $200.00
per month car allowance. (Record at 2.)
5.
The Plaintiff was terminated on the 15th day of
October, 1999. (Record at 2.)
6.
Defendant Pelton said that Plaintiff was
terminated because she was pregnant and unable to lift.
(Record at 2.)
7.
Plaintiff specifically discussed lifting with her
doctor and was able to lift all items she had been required to
lift during her employment with Creative Comer, Inc. (Record
at 2.)
8.
Plaintiff was terminated because she was
pregnant. (Record at 2.)
9.
At the time Plaintiff was terminated, Defendants
employed fewer than fifteen (15) employees. (Record at 2.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Judge Medley correctly determined that under Retherferd v. AT&T

Communs. oftheMt States, Inc., 1992 UT 844 P.2d 949, Peterson v. Browning, 1992 UT
832 P.2d 1280 and Burton v. Exam Center Industrial and General Medical Clinic, Inc.,
2000 UT 18, 994 P.2d 1261, that Title VII, the cited federal statutes and Utah State
Executive Orders do not create a public policy exception to the at-will employment
presumption in Utah.
5

A.

The plain language of the exclusive remedy provisions of the UAD A

states a legislative intent to limit all employment discrimination claims in the State of Utah
to those claims which meet the specific requirements of the Act.
B.

The Burton case rejects, as a basis for an employment discrimination

claim, Title VII and each case cited by Byers in the trial court.
C.

Under Burton and Peterson v. Browning, each of the federal and state

statutes, regulations and Utah Executive Orders cited by Byers are inapplicable to the case
sub judicia since each statute, regulation and Executive Order govern the employment
relationship between the federal or state government and its employees or contractors.
2.

Byers misinterpreted Judge Medley's Rule 59 Memorandum Decision as

having failed to consider 156 federal statutes and regulations, 5 Utah statutes and 22
administrative regulations and 10 Executive Orders where the Memorandum Decision
specifically refers to the statutes, regulations and Executive Orders.
A.

Judge Medley considered and rejected the federal and state statutes

and Executive Orders cited in Byers' Supplemental Authorities based upon Byers' failure
to analyze any of the statutes, regulations, or Executive Orders as required by Peterson v.
Browning.
B.

Judge Medley properly rejected eight newly analyzed federal statutes

and Executive Order as new legal theory brought for the first time in a post-judgment
motion.
6

C.

Rejecting the eight newly analyzed federal statutes and Executive

Order is harmless error since, as a matter of law, none reflect a clear and substantial public
policy of the State of Utah.
3.

Since no claim for relief is stated against Creative Comer, Inc., the employer,

it follows that no claim for relief is stated against its President, Lyn Pelton.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT UNDER UTAH LAW NO
COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION
OF AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE BASED UPON SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION.
The trial court correctly dismissed Ms. Byers' Complaint based upon Ms. Byers'
inability to identify any federal or state statute or regulation identifying a clear and
substantial public policy in Utah against a small employer terminating an employee based
upon sex. The Complaint at paragraph 13 (R.3; Addendum) alleges two specific statutory
basis for Utah public policy, i.e. the UADA and Title VII.

In her Supplemental

Memorandum (R. 100-133; Addendum), Ms. Byers also set forth ten Utah Executive
Orders and one-hundred fifty-six (156) federal statutory citations, Utah Statutes and 22
administrative regulations, all of which were considered and rejected by the trial court.
In January, 2000, this court decided Burton v. Exam Center Industrial and General
Medical Clinic, Inc., 2000 UT 18, 994 P.2d 1261, which is virtually identical to the case
before the court except that the Plaintiff, Dr. Burton, alleged age discrimination and here,
the allegation is discrimination based upon sex. The Burton court specifically rejected
7

identical arguments and case law now being advanced by Ms. Byers as creating a public
policy exception to the at-will employment presumption. The sliver of hope which the
Utah Supreme Court left on the horizon in the Burton case for Ms. Byers' sex
discrimination claim is contained in dictum written in reply to Justice Durham's and
Stewart's dissent which states:
The dissent charges that our decision opens the door for small
employers in Utah to discriminate not only on the basis of age,
but on the basis of sex, race, religion, and disability. Suffice
it to here say that sex, race, religion, and disability may
present considerations and a public policy against discrimination on those grounds might conceivably be found in other
statutes of this state. Id., 994 at 1267
The Burton court considered and rejected Title VII as basis for Utah public policy,
which is the single significant basis alleged on appeal by Ms. Byers for her public policy
argument. Title VII is clearly not "statutes of this state" required by the Burton dictum.
The Utah Executive Orders and federal statutes additionally alleged by Ms. Byers are
inapplicable to private employers in the State of Utah and have been rejected by this court
in Burton as a basis for Utah public policy. The trial court, having followed the
precedence of the Burton decision and Retherford v. AT&T Communication of Mountain
States, Inc., 1992 UT 844 P.2d 949 and Peterson v. Browning, 1992 UT 832 P.2d 1280,
correctly determined that the Complaint fails to state a claim against the Appellees upon
which relief may be granted.

8

A.

The UADA Exclusive Remedy Provisions. The original Utah Anti-

Discrimination Act was enacted in 1969 with the purpose of eliminating discrimination in
payment of wages based solely on sex, where men and women were doing the same or
similar work under all of these same conditions. Kopp v. Salt Lake City, 1973 UT, Utah
2d 170, 506 P.2d 809. The UADA creates a statutory cause of action against an employer
for discrimination based upon protected categories which is enforceable by the State of
Utah through the Division of Anti-Discrimination and Labor. Utah Code Ann. §34A-5107. The UADA defines an employer as a "person employing 15 or more employees
within the state

" Utah Code Ann. 34A-5-102.

Utah Code Ann. §34A-5-106 defines a set of "discriminatory or unfair employment
practices", which in pertinent part states:
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice to take any action described in
Subsections (l)(a) through (f).
(a)(i). An employer may not refuse to hire,
promote, discharge, demote, or terminate any person, or to
retaliate against, harass, or discriminate in matters of
compensation or in terms, privileges, and conditions of
employment against any person otherwise qualified, because
of:
(A) race;
(B)
color;
(C) sex;
(D) pregnancy, childbirth, pregnancy-related conditions;

9

Utah Code Ann. §35A-5-107 provides the procedure for "an aggrieved person" to
file a claim, which requires filing with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Commission, a
request for agency action within one hundred eighty (180) days of the alleged
discriminatory or prohibitive employment practice, with the promise that the Commission
shall investigate the claim, attempt to settle the claim, and in the event settlement is
unsuccessful, adjudicate the claim.
Critically important to the statutory framework which creates the cause of action in
Utah for a discrimination in employment claim is the exclusive remedy section of the
UADA, §34A-5-107(15) which states:
The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive
remedy under state law for employment discrimination based
upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth or
pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin or
disability.
This court has determined that the UADA preempts common law claims of
employment discrimination in the State of Utah. In Retherferd v. AT&T Communs. of the
Mountain States, Inc., 1992 UT 844 P.2d 949, the court held:
We begin with Retherferd's claim for discharge in violation
of public policy. In order to prove this tort, Retherferd must
show that AT&T discharged her in a manner or for a reason
that contravened a "clear and substantial public policy" of the
State of Utah, a public policy rooted in Utah's constitution or
statute, (citation omitted). The only possible source in Utah's
statutes or constitution for a clear and substantial policy
allegedly violated by Retherferd's discharge is the UADA's
prohibition of retaliation based on good faith Complaints of
10

employment discrimination. (Utah Code Ann. §34-35-2(15).
Without deciding that the statute at issue rises to the level of
a clear and substantial public policy, we find that in the
absence of this public policy declaration, Retherferd would be
unable to allege an action for this tort. Simply put, if there
were no UADA policy against retaliation, there could be no
tort for discharge in violation of this public policy. Applying
the Mounteer test (the "indispensable element" test) it is plain
that the harm the UADA addresses is an indispensable
element in Retherferd's tort cause of action; therefore, the
UADA must preempt this claim. Id., 844 at 965.
Importantly, this court emphasized that the only possible source in Utah for a clear
and substantial public policy related to the discharge based upon retaliation was the
UADA, and did not rely upon Title VII or any other federal statute specifically prohibiting
retaliation in employment. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2,-3.
The Burton court interpreted the holding in Retherford as applying to only those
employers who were subject to the act, i.e. those employing greater than fifteen (15)
employees. Burton, 99 A P.2d at 1264. The holding leaves open the possibility of a claim
of wrongful discharge against an employer who is not subject to the terms of the UADA,
i.e., those employing less than fifteen (15) persons, under an exception to the at-will
employment presumption in Utah based upon violation of a clear and substantial public
policy.
B.

Utah Public Policy Exception to "At-will Employment Presumption".

A Plaintiff attempting to establish a public policy exception to the at-will employment
presumption carries a heavy burden under Utah law. In Peterson v. Browning, 1992 UT
11

832 P.2d 1280, the court described the public policy exceptions in terms of an employee's
conduct, not status, such as age or sex, as follows:
Actions falling within the public policy exception typically
involved termination of employment for (1) refusing to
commit an illegal or wrongful act, (2) performing a public
obligation, or (3) exercising a legal right or privilege (citations
omitted). Id. 832, P.2d at 1281. Also See Ryan v. Dan's
Food Stores, Inc. 1998 UT 972 P.2d 395, 408.
The court then underscored the burden of a Plaintiff:
This court has indicated that it will narrowly construe the
public policies on which a wrongful termination act may be
based (citations omitted). It is not the purpose of the
exception to eliminate employer discretion in discharging atwill employees (citations omitted), or to impose a requirement
of "good cause" for discharge of every employee.
Accordingly, we hold that the public policy exception applies
in this state when the statutory language expressing the public
conscience is clear and when the affected interests of society
are substantial. The identification of clear and substantia]
public policies will require case-by-case development. £ ,
832 P.2d at 1281-82.
The Peterson court then clearly delineated the requirements a Plaintiff must
establish to provide a showing of a "clear and substantial public policy":
To provide the basis for an action under the public policy
exception, a violation of a state or federal law must
contravene the clear and substantial public policy of the State
of Utah. Although many state and federal laws will reflect the
Utah public policy, and may, in fact, provide the source of
Utah public policy, a Plaintiff must establish the connection
between the law violated and the public policies of the State
of Utah. Id., 832 P.2d at 1282. Also See. Fox v. MCI
Communications Corp., 1997 UT 931 P.2d 857.
12

Angela Byers' Complaint and supporting authorities completely fail under the
Peterson test to "establish the connection between the law violation and the public policies
of the State of Utah".
C.

Title VII Is Not a Basis for the Public Policy Exception in Utah. The Burton

case specifically and squarely rejected each basis raised by Byers in her Complaint and in
this appeal as creating a basis for public policy exception to the at-will employment
presumption in the State of Utah.
In that case, Dr. Burton claimed that he had been terminated on the basis of his age
which violated the UADA and the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §621-634 (1998), as well as other federal statutes. Byers sets forth the same five
cases in the trial court and in this appeal which were rejected by this court in Burton as
setting forth a basis for creating a public policy exception: Molesworth v. Brandon, 341
Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996); Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp.
733(D)Md. (1992); Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St. 3d 65, 652 N.E. 2d 653 (1995);
Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn. 2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990) and Williamson v. Greene, 200
W. Va. 421, 490 S.E. 2d 23 (1997).
Contrary to the reasoning in the five cases advanced by Ms. Byers, the Utah
Supreme Court in Burton adopted the California Supreme Court's reasoning in Jennings
v. Marralle, 8 Cal. 4th 121, 876 P.2d 1074, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. 1994) which
considered the public policy argument contained in California's Fair Employment and
13

Housing Act. The Act declares a public policy of protecting the right and opportunity to
seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination on various grounds, including
age, which was defined as over 40 years. Exempted from the terms of the act were "small
employers" which were defined as employers who employ less than five employees. The
Burton court quoted the Jennings Court as follows:
This exemption of small employers from the FEHA ban on
age discrimination was enacted simultaneously to and is
inseparable from the legislative statement of policy. For that
reason, and because no other statute or constitutional
provision barred age discrimination, we conclude that there
presently exists no "fundamental policy" which precludes age
discrimination by a small employer. Thus, there is no
independent basis for an action for tortuous discharge in
violation of policy. Burton v. Exam Center Industrial and
General Medical Clinic, Inc. at 1065 and Jennings v. Morralle
at 1076.
The Burton court then adopted the Jennings court reasoning holding:
We are not persuaded that the UAD A declares a public policy
which is "clear and substantial" with respect to small
employers. The California Supreme Court's reasoning in
Jennings that "the exemption of small employers from
[California's] FEHA ban on age discrimination was enacted
simultaneously to, and is inseparable from, the legislative
statement of policy, is sound and unanswerable. Our
legislature has made a similar decision to prohibit age
discrimination in the termination of employees only by large
employers and, if, as Burton contends, small employers should
likewise be prohibited, that is a matter for the legislature, not
the court, should address." Id., 994 P.2d at 1266.

14

The language from the Burton case while dealing directly with the UADA, applies
equally as well to the Title VII legislation. Like the UADA, Title VII applies only to
employers having greater than fifteen (15) employees. Title VII has expressed terms
prohibiting discrimination in employment based on sex, age, religion, national origin. It
defies reason and logic to advance the proposition that where the Utah Supreme Court will
not substitute its judgment for that of the Utah State Legislature regarding the exemption
provided in the UADA, it would change its declared position and substitute its opinion for
that of the United States Congress and determine that a claim is created under Title VII
against small employers as stating Utah public policy on sex discrimination in
employment. The language from Justice Barbara Manson's dissent in Roberts v. Dudley,
2000 WA, 140 Wn. 2d58, 993 P.2d 901 is clearly applicable:
The majority also relies on the language in the WLAD which
states that the statute is not meant to limit other types of
actions for sex discrimination. It reasons that because the law
declares that it is a civil right to be free from discrimination in
employment, the small employer exemption cannot preclude
a civil action. This logic does not hold. The civil right is
created in terms of employment by employers of eight or more
persons. It is illogical to conclude that the Legislature
intended to both protect small employers and subject them to
liability in the same statute. Id., 993 P.2d at 914.
Additionally, the Burton court specifically found that Title VII's legislative history
has the same purpose as the UADA, which further demonstrates the Burton court's specific
consideration and rejection of Title VII in its ruling:

15

Several federal courts have expressed the same reasons for
small employers exemption found in certain antidiscrimination statutes. See e.g. Tomka v. Seller Corp., 66
F.3d 1295, 1314 (Second Circ. 1995) (legislative history
indicates that "the protection of intimate and personal
relations existing in small business" was the reason for Title
VIFs small employer exemption); Miller v. Maxwell's Int.,
Inc.,9\ F.2d583,587(9 th Cir. 1993) ("Congress did not want
to burden small entities with costs associated with litigating
discrimination claims." Id., 993 P.2d at 1267.
Finally, the Burton opinion specifically rejects Title VII as a basis for creating a
clear and substantial public policy in Utah, stating:
Nor do we find any federal statute that can provide the basis
for a tort action against small employers. See, heathen v.
Research Found, of City Univ. of N.Y, 658 F. Supp. 651
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that federal claim under federal
statute "cannot serve as a basis to expand employees'
remedies under New York state common law of tort").
Because we can find no constitutional provision or other
statute which declares a clear and substantial public policy
against age discrimination in employment practices, we must
decline to create an exception to the general rule prevailing in
this state that employment is presumed to be on an at-will
basis for both the employer and the employee. Id., 993 P.2d
at 1266.
No other jurisdiction, in creating a public policy exception to the at-will
presumption, has relied on the federally enacted Title VII as the primary basis for a public
policy exception, but has looked almost exclusively to statutes of the state. Molesworth
v. Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 (1996) ("at least thirty-four statutes, one executive order, and
one constitutional amendment in Maryland"); Collins v. Rizkana, 1995 OH, 652 N.E. 2d
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653 (specific state statute prohibiting discrimination by "any employer", RC4112.02; at
criminal statutes, RC2097.06 and .21); Bennett v. Hardy, 1990 WA, 784 P.2d 1258 (Citing
Washington's law against discrimination, RCW 49.60); Williamson v. Greene, 1997 WV
490 S.E.2d 23 (Citing West Virginia Human Rights Act).
Byers has not alleged any facts, statutes, regulations or constitutional provisions
which sets apart her claim for sexual discrimination from Burton's claim for age
discrimination. Byers' claim must be denied under the sound principles set forth in
Burton.
Finally, Byers claim that Title VII sets forth a "clear and substantial public policy"
of the State of Utah must fail under the requirements ofPeterson v. Browning in that Byers
has not and cannot set forth "the connection between the law violated and the public
policies of Utah".
If the legislature had intended that a cause of action for employment discrimination
extend beyond the terms of the existing UADA, it could have amended the provisions of
the UADA in its last legislative session in the wake of the Burton decision. However, no
legislative action was taken evidencing this state's intention not to extend prohibition
regarding discrimination in employment practices beyond the exclusive remedy provisions
of the UADA.
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The spurious argument that the Burton case does not apply to the case before the
court was raised by Byers for the first time in her Rule 59 Memorandum and should not
be considered by the court. In Re: Estate ofJustheim, supra.
Title VII simply does not create a "clear and substantial public polic)'" in the State
of Utah with respect to discriminatory practices by private employers employing less than
fifteen (15) people.
D.

The Executive Orders Do Not Apply to Appellants. Each of the Executive

Orders signed by Utah governors cited by Ms. Byers in her brief at pages 14 and 15 apply
only to employees of the State of Utah, its subdivisions, and the State's contractors. The
Burton court rejected statutes or administrative regulations applying to governmental
employees as a basis for restrictions on a private employer: "Amicus also relies on Utah
Administrative Code R606-3-2, which prohibits age discrimination by persons contracting
with the state. While arguably a public policy can be found in that statute and code, it
obviously has no application to a private employer." Burton, 994 P,2d at 1266.
E.

Federal Statutes Cited by Appellant are Inapplicable. Each of the federal

statutes cited by Appellant at pages 12 to 14 in her brief were initially submitted post-trial
in support of the Motion for a New Trial and therefore should not be addressed by this
court as part of the correctness of the ruling of the trial court with respect to granting
Appellees' Motion to Dismiss. In Re: Estate ofJustheim, 1984 UT 824 P.2d 432, 434.
(see section II herein). However, in addition, each of the cited statutes do not apply to
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Creative Comer, Inc. and its employees in the State of Utah as required under Peterson v.
Browning, supra and Burton v. Exam Center Industrial and General Medical Clinic, Inc.
The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USC §206(b) relates to discrimination in compensation
to employees so long as the employer is covered by the terms of the Act, which require a
gross income in excess of 5500,000 and participation in interstate commerce.
Ms. Byers cites 42 USC §5057 which makes it illegal for an employer to
discriminate on the basis of sex regarding a volunteer. Clearly, this does not apply to the
employment relationship between Creative Comers, Inc. and Angela Byers.
42 U.S.C. §5057 applies to sex discrimination among "volunteers" which clearly
Angela Byers is not. The remaining four codes of federal regulation, 49 CFR §26 5.7,23
CFR §230.113,47 CFR §73.2080 and 41 CFR §60-1.4 apply to government employment
where those who contract with the government and not private employers.
Finally, 2 U.S.C. §1311 and 3 U.S.C. §411 apply to the President of the United
States and the United States Congress and not a private employer.
Ms. Byers has failed in her attempt to set forth any "statutes of this state" which
create a public policy against discrimination based upon sex. The trial court correctly
found that Ms. Byers failed to state a claim against the Defendants upon which relief may
be granted.
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED
ADDITIONAL POST-JUDGMENT LEGAL THEORIES.
Angela Byers misinterprets and/or misrepresents the trial court's ruling on her Rule
59 Motion. In order to address the misinterpretation, the course of proceedings before the
trial court are critically important:
After Appellees submitted their Reply Memorandum on the Motion to Dismiss,
Angela Byers submitted a Supplemental Memorandum listing citations to 156 federal
statute and CFR regulations, five Utah statutes, 22 administrative regulations, and ten Utah
Executive Orders, asserting without any required analysis that these statutes and Executive
Orders adequately reflect a clear and substantial public policy in the State of Utah
regarding sex discrimination. (Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum R. 100-123;
Addendum).

After Appellees submitted their Reply Memorandum (R. 124-133;

Addendum), the trial court granted Appellee's Motion to Dismiss after having considered
the federal and state statutes and Executive Orders advanced by Byers. Byers then
submitted her Rule 59 Motion and supporting memorandum where she provided analysis
regarding eight of the previously cited federal statutes and five of the Utah Executive
Orders, claiming each creates a clear and substantial public policy prohibiting sex
discrimination in the State of Utah. (R. 165-173; Addendum).
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The trial court correctly determined not to consider the additional analysis made
by Angela Byers regarding the eight federal statues and Utah Executive Orders in its Rule
59 decision.
A.

Utah Standard on Rule 59 Motions. Motions for new trials are generally not

favored at the law, in part because it is costly and inefficient to hold multiple trials on the
same cause of action. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 1991 UT, 817 P.2d 789, 803. Courts
do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial err has tainted the
proceedings or that substantial justice has not been done. 817 P.2d at 804-805. A trial
court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at least one of the grounds
set forth in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moonlake Elec. Ass. yn v.
Ultra Systems WConstructors, Inc., 1988 UT App? 767 P.2d 125, 128.
B,

Byers Misinterprets the Trial Court's Rule 59 Decision. Angela Byers

misinterprets and/or misrepresent's the trial court's Rule 59 Memorandum Decision when
she declares:
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court declined to
consider citation to statutes, regulations, and executive orders
other than those cited in the Complaint on the grounds that
they were "outside the pleadings." The trial court erred.
(Appellant's brief, 20-21).
Under it's Ruling with respect to Rule 59, the trial court distinguishes between the
statutes and Executive Orders submitted in the Supplemental Authorities Memorandum
and the Rule 59 Memorandum:
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In an attempt to mirror Molesworth, the Plaintiff filed a
Supplemental Memorandum with an attachment listing 156
federal codes, five Utah Statutes and 22 Utah Regulations
which prohibits sex discrimination under various
circumstances. The Plaintiff stated that the list was provided
"as additional sources of public policy against sex
discrimination, in addition to the UADA and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act. . ." Supplemental Memorandum Authority
P.2. However, the Plaintiff provided no copies of these to the
court, nor any legal analysis which explains how the latter
provisions provide a clear and substantial policy against sex
discrimination in the State of Utah.
In her Rule 59 Motion, the Plaintiff provided additional
statutes and Executive Orders (emphasis added) it would like
this court to "analyze" as well. Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion
P.6. However, these latter statutes and Executive Orders
(emphasis added) are outside the pleadings, could not have
been considered by this court in its ruling on the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, and cannot be considered now to find an
error of law in the previous proceeding. Therefore, this court
will not consider the additional statutes and Executive Orders
in this decision (Memorandum Decision, P.2.)
In the next paragraph of the Memorandum Decision, the court specifically stated:
The only issue this court will review is whether the court
committed an error of law by not finding a clear and
substantial public policy exception for sex discrimination by
small employers based on the list of codes, statutes and
regulations attached by the Plaintiff in her Supplemental
Memorandum. (Memorandum Decision, p. 2)
Contrary to the assertion that the court failed to properly consider the additional
statutory authority for sex discrimination, the court specifically notes that it is doing so.
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C.

The Court Correctly Declined to Consider "New Legal Theories" in its

Ruling on the Pleadings. Under Utah law, each of the 156 federal statutes, five Utah
Statutes and 22 administrative rules, and ten Executive Orders are potentially a separate
basis for Utah public policies; therefore in order to establish a clear and substantial public
policy, each must be analyzed to demonstrate the application of the statute to the facts
before the Court and how contravention of the statute specifically contravenes a public
policy in the State of Utah. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 1989 UT 771, P.2d 1033;
Retherford v. AT&T Communs. of the ML States, Inc., 1992 UT, 844 P.2d 949; Peterson
v. Browning, 1992 UT 832, P.2d 1280, 1283.
Angela Byers failed in her Supplemental Authorities Memorandum to perform any
analysis of the statute and the court declined to do the work for her. The conclusory
statements made in Byers' Rule 59 Motion regarding the previously cited, but not analyzed
federal states were essentially new legal theories. As new legal theories were being
advanced in post-trial motions, the court properly declined to consider the theories. Estate
ofJustheim, 824 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah App. 1991).
D.

Failure to Consider Eight Federal Statutes and Executive Orders is Harmless

Error. Even in the event the trial court should have considered the eight newly "analyzed"
federal statutes and Utah Executive Orders, the failure to do so is harmless error. None of
the cited federal statutes or Utah State Executive Orders apply to Appellee Creative
Corner, Inc. (See Argument, Section II D. and E.)
23

If the court erred by failing to consider the federal statutes Executive Orders in its
Rule 59 Memorandum Decision, it was harmless error not affecting the outcome of the
decision. State v. Hamilton, 1992 UT 827 P.2d 232, 240.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
THE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PELTON.
Having failed to generally state a claim for relief on the basis of sexual
discrimination in employment against Creative Comer, Inc., the trial court correctly
dismissed the claims against Lyn Pelton, President, Creative Comer, Inc., Burton v. Exam
Center Industrial and General Clinic, Inc.
CONCLUSION
Angela Byers failed to cite any federal or state statute or regulation, or constitutional
provision which prohibits Creative Comer, Inc., an employer of less than fifteen (15)
people, from terminating an employee allegedly based upon sexual discrimination. There
is no "clear and substantial public policy" in the State of Utah relating to small employers
termination of employees based upon sex. The exclusive remedy provisions of the UADA
declares a clear legislative policy of the State of Utah that a common law tort of
discrimination based upon sex for a small employer is not recognized. The holding the
Burton case that no common law cause of action exist in the state of Utah against small
employers based upon allegations of discrimination in employment based upon protected
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classification absent a clear and substantial public policy squarely applies to require
upholding of the trial court's dismissal of Byers' claim.
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